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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
All rulings-made by the district court were made pursuant to authority granted by Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Accordingly, all questions are founded upon the issue of whether 
legal determinations by the district court were proper and are REVIEWED FOR 
CORRECTNESS. 
Standard of Review: An appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the moving party and affirms summary 
judgment only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, 
or where, even according to the facts as contended by the nonmoving party, the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 
P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, an appellate court accords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court in granting summary judgment, but instead reviews them for correctness. Girbich v. 
Nurned, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999); Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 1: Did the district court err in determining there was no genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to the non-existence of a confidential relationship between Appellees and 
the decedent, or resulting undue influence? (R. 267-71; 601-09; 748-54; 1213-19.) 
1 
Applicable Standard: While a few relationships, such as that of attoreney and client, 
are presumed to be confidential, in all other relationships the existence of a confidential 
relationship is a question of fact. In re Estate of Dale, 878 P.2d 1168,1174 (Utah App. 1994); 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). Consequently, a motion for summary 
judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613,615 (Utah 1982); Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah App. 1988) ("Judgment should 
only be granted when it appears 'there is no reasonable probability that the party moved 
against could prevail.'" (citations omitted)). Reviewed for correctness, supra. 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in determining there was no genuine issue of material 
fact as to the lack of any clear and convincing evidence of a different intention of the decedent 
at the time the joint bank accounts were created? (R. 271-75; 609-11; 1125-27; 1200-01; 
1213-19.) 
Applicable Standard: A determination of a contrary intent pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-6-104(1) is an issue of fact. Consequently, amotion for summary judgment should 
be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 
favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45. Reviewed for 
correctness, supra. 
2 
Issue 3: Did the district court improperly draw all inferences and resolve all factual 
disputes in favor of Appellees, the moving parties? (R. 600; 747.) 
Applicable Standard: A motion for summary judgment should be denied where the 
evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the 
nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45. Reviewed for correctness, 
supra. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES. STATUTES, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs the proper disposal of claims on summary 
judgment: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1) governs the rights of parties to a joint bank account, 
including rights of survivorship, upon the death of a party to the account: 
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to 
the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there 
is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account 
is created. If there are two or more surviving parties, their respective 
ownerships during lifetime shall be in proportion to their previous ownership 
interests under Section 75-6-103 augmented by an equal share for each survivor 
3 
of any interest the decedent may have owned in the account immediately before 
his death; and the right of survivorship continues between the surviving parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The genesis of this case involves a dispute over the estate of the decedent, Nina E. 
Tolley, who died in West Valley City, Utah, on October 16, 2003. In the immediate months 
preceding her death, the decedent, following the promptings of her grandchildren, left her 
home of approximately 19 years in South Dakota to reside in a home with her grandson, 
Appellee Michael Tolley (aM. Tolley"). (R. 596-99; 741-44.) During the few months the 
decedent was domiciled in Utah, she lived in a state of near complete physical dependency, 
relying upon Appellees M. Tolley, Marie Jess ("Jess"), and other siblings for her daily care 
and board. (R. 741-44.) 
Prior to her move to Utah in July, 2003, the decedent had executed a valid Last Will 
and Testament, dated April 29, 1992, which named her three children, including Petitioner-
Appellant Donald Ray Tolley (son), Cheryl Lynn Blaisdell (daughter), and Appellees 
deceased father, Kenneth John Miller (son), as sole beneficiaries of her estate. (R.600;744.) 
Notwithstanding, following a series of high level spending and alleged gift giving following 
her move to Utah, on September 25, 2003, the decedent's personal bank accounts were 
suddenly and inexplicably closed and monies therein transferred into three separate joint 
accounts with Appellee Jess. (R.597-98; 1129.) Though these new joint bank accounts 
named Appellee as a party to the account, all monies therein came solely from the decedent. 
(R. 597-98.) 
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On the morning of Friday, Oclobei 1 ;. J'(HIA:il .ippp'siinatch '' ll||l.«n il |mni kink 
,i i n in in in I wnv «iu i I'lh rlnsril In NnnHliY loss and all monies therein transferred by Jess into 
her personal bank accounts. (R. 599.) 
I Jpon Appellant's subsequent discovery that approximately I' \<N)il »l lir. innlliu s 
11« •« -r, J f* . * • - • • • ,
 i nts and thereafter to Appellee's personal account, 
Appellant promptly filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of 
Personal Representative u, ;..v. i i*.^; - * . on Oc tobei 29, 2003, folio v c d 
li; a I" 1c ti ;3i:i for I emporary Restraining Order on November 5, 2003. (R. 1-5; 18-30; 599.) 
Following a hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. K u i s . Appellant was granted a 
temporary restraining oi j . i ,; -»• • k 
accounts be placed in escrow with the law firm of Strong & Hanni pending further disposition 
of the matter. (R. 31 -34; Add. 4.) 
liicjcii:! y my Ilk In ii 11 iiiiii! tppuinlniriil Il A|if i 11,oil as personal trpivsnitjfive 
of the estate, on September 15, 2004, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Recovery of 
Property was filed by Appellant on behalf of the estate, naming Appellees as Respondents. 
(K "II I ' " I ' i I III IVtftiitn .illi'ivil jiihuii' iilht i lliiii •, lliat .'b'onfidcnlial relationship 
existed between the decedent and Appellees thereby giving rise to a presumption of undue 
influence over the decedent; that the decedent never intended to gift funds from the joint 
accoi intand :)tlic: rpi opei I:>< to Appellees; and thai \nnellees and others had committed fraud 
and conversion against the decedent and her estate. (R. 267-84.) 
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On or about August 11,2005, Respondent-Appellee Jess filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment requesting dismissal of all claims. (R. 416-91.) Soon thereafter, on or about 
August 31, 2005, Appellee M. Tolley filed a similar Motion for Summary Judgment 
requesting the same relief. (R. 252-91.) Opposing memoranda were filed by Appellant on 
September 2 and 16, 2005, respectively. (R. 592-706; 735-860.) 
A hearing on Appellees' Motions was held before Judge Lewis on February 2,2006, 
at which time the district court took the matter under advisement, granting additional 
extensions of time to conduct discovery and thereafter leave to file supplemental opposing and 
supporting memoranda. (R. 1982; 1115-17; 1237-41.) 
A Memorandum Decision was ultimately entered by the district court on May 16,2006, 
granting both Motions and ordering summary judgment on all claims in favor of Appellees. 
(R. 1213-19; Add. 3.) In arriving at its decision, the district court gave particular deference 
to an undisputed fact regarding the decedent's general state of mind; specifically, that the 
decedent "was mentally sharp, decisive, strong willed and knew exactly what she wanted and 
what she did not want." (R. 1215-16; 528-29.) The court further supported its opinion with 
references to affidavit and deposition testimony of certain third parties, including the 
decedent's previous caretaker and confidant, bank personnel at both of the decedent's Utah 
banking establishments, and other various individuals. (R. 1216-17; 709-9; 1176-81.) 
Importantly, the district court determined that Appellant had failed to present evidence 
to contradict "the overwhelming amount of Affidavit and deposition testimony" regarding the 
decedent's state of mind. (R. 1217.) Stated the court in its decision: "Instead, the petitioner 
6 
[Appellant] relies on itlferences which cannot be reasonably made and mcorica 
iuu -rpi , i . :•. . . . •! " (R 121 / ) \ s a resi lit, the low e r court determined 
Given the complete absence of evidence to indicate that the respondents 
[Appellees] [i] controlled the decedent's decision-making or [ii] that they 
overcame her will,... as a matter of law, the petitioner [Appellant had] failed 
to establish a confidential relationship between the decedent and [Appellees] 
or that [Appellees] unduly influenced the decedent. 
) . . 
< ;.} liViiiiu"., the district court did not rule Appellees had 
demonstrated or proved the absence of any unfairness for benefits received from the decedent 
and the joint bank accounts, bcc, m i\ usiaie ofJones/ r> _.:.- * •' u.. ^ \ . . :>). 
(R. 1217-18.) Further, and for particular purpose in this Appeal, the court did not directly 
rule on an} of the stated intentions of the decedent during the period in question. CR. P1 "-
. . .MiHLiip' - »t«.r n concerning tl le 1 • -\ \ \ *i S.^^MH^; ,-p 
or resulting undue influence, the court conclusively granted summary judgment on all claims 
including those related to the decedent's intentions and, as a corollary, Appellan's fraud, 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed by Appellant on May 23,2006. (R. 1220-29.) 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
In addi; 1 
memoranda, (R. 593-60; 736-47; 1120-29), facts particularly relevant to the issues presented 
for review are as follows: 
7 
1. Prior to her move to Utah, the decedent was repeatedly assured by Appellees 
that all of her living expenses would be paid for by others or that she would not have to spend 
any money toward such expenses if she moved to Utah. (R. 596-97; 741-42.). 
2. Immediately following her move, on or about July 21, 2003, the decedent 
opened a checking account with Bank One, West Valley City, Utah, in her name only. (R. 
597; 742.) 
3. From July through September 2003, numerous checks were drawn on this Bank 
One account made payable to Appellees and to their utility companies, long distance carriers, 
and credit card companies. (R. 597; 742-43.) 
4. Appellees admit having often filled out checks for the decedent to sign because 
she had trouble writing. (R. 742.) 
5. On September 25, 2003, the decedent's Bank One account was suddenly and 
inexplicably closed and the monies therein transferred to three separate new accounts at First 
Utah Bank, Appellee Jess' preferred banking establishment. (R. 597-98; 743-44.) 
6. Appellee conceded that at the time the Bank One account was closed, the 
decedent told Appellee she wanted her named on the First Utah accounts but did not say why. 
(R. 425.) 
7. The new First Utah accounts were opened as joint accounts in the name of the 
decedent and Appellee Jess even though all of the monies therein came solely from the 
decedent. (R. 597; 743-44.) 
8 
8. During hei discussion at signing \ > it! 1 the I ;iii st I Jtal 11 epi e se ntati v e. ' I in 1 :)tl ly 
Claridge, certain characteristics of account "ownership" were discussed; however, the legal 
ramifications of right of survivorship and associated consequences at death pointedly were 
not (R 1122-24 ; 1129 3 1 .) .. . , .. 
9. Instead, the decedent expressed that 
[S]he wanted to make sure that if anything were to happen to her, not 
necessarily dying, but if anything were to happen to her, she wanted to make 
sure that Marie Jess had complete access to any of her bank accounts to make 
sure she could maintain bills, hospital needs, whatever else would come up. 
[Tjhat she wanted [Appellee] to have that sort of authority, that sort of 
ownership so that if she was not able to carry on her business, that [Appellee] 
would be able to go throiigli and handle her affairs for her. 
(R. 1129-34 [Claridge Depo. at 34:4-35:2; 57:18-59:6].) 
10. The decedent's expressed intent regarding the purpose o. n^ \,;iia jank 
accounts was consistent with her previously expressed intent at the time she opened the Bank 
One account; to have Appellees "help[ the decedent] with all of [her] banking relationship." 
(R 1129: 113- 5 [Christopher Depo. at 48:9 25].) 
11. Prior to opening the j oint accounts, the decedent issued several checks from the 
Bank One account made payable to Appellee Jess. (R. 598 ) 
1 
payment of the decedent's expenses. (R. 598.) 
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13- After opening the joint bank accounts, Appellee Jess ceased receiving 
"reimbursements" directly from the decedent and began issuing her own checks from the joint 
accounts. (R. 598.) 
14. Appellee never contributed her own funds to the joint accounts. (R. 598.) 
15. On Friday, October 17, 2003, at approximately 9:49 a.m., the joint bank 
accounts were closed by Appellee Jess and all monies therein transferred into Appellee's 
personal accounts. This closure occurred less than 24 hours after the decedent's death. (R. 
598-99.) 
16. At the hearing and before the district court, Appellee Jess repeatedly maintained 
she acted exclusively as an administrator of the decedent's estate, expressing an obligation 
to disburse money to certain relatives at the request of the decedent, and arguing she had 
neither the intent nor right to disburse monies contrary to the decedent's instructions. (R. 265; 
599; Add. 3, pp. 4-1, 20, 34.) 
17. The decedent was extremely guarded in her finances, very conservative in her 
spending, and quite sparing in her use of credit cards. The high levels of spending evident 
from the decedent's bank accounts and credit cards and alleged "gift" giving after she 
relocated to Utah was manifestly inconsistent with her prior spending habits in South Dakota. 
(R. 599; 743.) 
18. Appellee M. Tolley in particular made several inconsistent statements regarding 
the decedent's move to Utah, her spending habits, and the administration of her financial 
affairs. (R. 745-46.). 
10 
1Q
 le transler oi v: . •» . • into the joint ua.ik accounts represented a substantial 
pc i tic II' : f thedece dent's * - -' • • • >ets, \ ! inconsistent ^ \ it! 1 her only w rittei i 
testamentary instrument, the April 29, 1992 Last Will and Testament. (R. 599-600; 744-45.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
existence a confidential relationship in order to defeat summary judgment. However, as the 
non-moving party, Appellant was not required to actually prove ;... ..aim; rather, merely 
proffer sufficient fiiM J "' ' " r- ' f...i- ,l \i •. Wee, When '- ' . - vhen 
properly viewed in a light most favorable to Appellant, demonstrated at least the inference of 
a confidential relationship, summary judgment should not have been granted. Specifically, 
where Appellee Jess repeatedly admitted to holding certain fiduciaiy duties inherent in a 
confidential relationship, in addition to other indicators demonstrating a position of superiority 
o v e i the decedent, a i easoi lab 1 e i i.. ^  i,: i, ^  i ^ i u ' i i i , ^ ;:. ^ nip between Appellees and 
the decedent is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Furthermore, h\ basing its decision exclusively on the issue of a confidential 
rHiilinri'ihip Hi * ili'ilnrl court impiripirlv iidiudiuiU'd (lie iii.ittu ol (lie t l a u l a i l \ « IIIIII.IIV 
intent. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1), rights of survivorship in a joint account 
are extinguished purely upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence of a different 
inlniliofi ill 11 it Inn* llir m cmml h cicfilnl ( IKS docs nol H quite v\ iilenee til ,i i (Hi(iiltii(i,il 
relationship, undue influence, coercion or even fraud; merely an intent contrary to the concept 
of survivorship at the time of creation. Where Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to 
11 
demonstrate at least the inference of the decedent's contrary intent at the time the joint bank 
accounts were opened, summary judgment on this issue was improper. 
Lastly, in all instances, the district court was improperly dismissive of certain facts 
material to Appellant's claims, including Appellee Jess' admissions of acting as a trustee or 
administrator of estate, and the stated intentions of the decedent at the time the joint accounts 
were created. Where the lower court incorrectly drew further inferences from the presented 
facts in favor of Appellees, the moving parties, summary judgment should not have been 
entered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The district court improperly determined that Appellant failed, as a matter 
of law, to establish a confidential relationship between Appellees and the 
decedent, or resulting undue influence. 
Contrary to the district court's final determination, as the non-moving party, Appellant 
was not required to conclusively establish the existence of a confidential relationship in order 
to defeat summary judgment. (R. 1217-18; Add. 4.) To successfully oppose a motion for 
summary judgment, it is not necessary for the non-moving party to actually prove its legal 
theory. James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 47. Rather, it is only necessary to show "facts" 
which controvert the stated "facts" of the movant and which, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, adequately support the elements of the disputed claim. See 
Id (reversing summary judgment where the opposing affidavit fell "far short" of proving its 
counter theory, but nonetheless demonstrated several unresolved factual questions). 
12 
Accordingly, the proper question in this matter is not whether Appellant, as a matter 
Appellees' motions, Appellant presented sufficient facts to create a reasonable inference that 
at least suggested as much. Jackson, 64. i\2d <u <>».- , j A] motion for summary judgment 
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law."). 
Here .»- • ! ' ' M I ^ H N V ' -; . -.HP .?-. { TP^mrntalu ; ^ , IJ ^ -f \npellant 
plainly meet this undemanding burden. 
A Appellant has presented sufficient facts to give rise to the inference 
of a confidential relationship. 
It has been consistently stated that "[a] confidential relationship arises when one party, 
after having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over 
tl: i,< »l h e r | >. LI II:; " ' i > / t: ; • ' h n i • : \ ' 7 5 9 P 2< 1345 3 47(1 Jti ih \ j »| : 1988)0 * ing J Veb M v 
v. Lehrner, 742 P,2d 1203. 1206 (I Jtah 1987)). This doctrine "rests upon a principle of 
inequality between the parties, an*. ; A ^ a position ol superiority occupied i > v.,,, u, [lie 
partiesoi ••. " M ./' • " , . H'1 ' ^ \ ' !-- J:.i un^\ Sm. :*\ !!\, 
The relationship must be such as would lead an ordinarily prudent person in the 
management of his business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the 
other party which largely results in the substitution of the will of the latter for 
that of the former in the material matters involved in the transaction. 
1
 After taking the matter under advisement, the district court subsequently accepted and relied 
on the supplemental memoranda submitted by both parties in reaching its decision. (R. 1213-
14; Add. 4; 1237-41.) 
13 
Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713. 
However, "[s]uch [a] relationship need not necessarily be of a formal nature." 
Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953). 
Further, while in most instances the issue of a confidential relationship becomes a 
question of fact, see Dale, 878 P.2d at 1174; Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632,636 (Utah 1984); 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1987), "[t]here are a few relationships (such 
as parent-child, attorney-client, [and] trustee-cestui) which the law presumes to be 
confidential." Blodgettv. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298,302 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added); Kuhre 
v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 291 (Utah App. 2005) (the attorney-client relationship is 
considered a "per se confidential relationship"); see also In re Estate ofKarney, 658 N.W.2d 
796, 799 n. 2 ("Fiduciary relationships—such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, agent-
principal, and attorney-client—required the highest duty of care" (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary (7th ed) (emphasis added)) and n. 3 ("In these situations, complete trust has been 
placed by one party in the hands of another who has the relevant knowledge, resources, 
power, or moral authority to control the subject matter at issue."). 
In the case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, the defendant appealed the decision 
of the trial court to set aside his sister's conveyance of real and personal property as the 
product of undue influence arising from a confidential relationship. 412 P.2d 920,921 (Utah 
1966). Refuting the defendant-appellant's contention that no confidential relationship existed, 
the Court observed the defendant's own admission that the sister's property was to have been 
14 
held in trust for purposes of defraying certain expenses at death. Id. "This/' the Court 
concluded, "should dispose of [the] contention that the court erred in finding there was a 
confidential relationship, since the requirements... as trustee, would be the same irrespective 
of whether such decision were based on a confidential relationship or trusteeship." Id. 
Here, in addition to several proffered facts indicative of the decedent's dependency on 
one side, and an exercise of superiority by Appellees on the other, (R. 593-600; 736-47), 
Appellant presented sufficient facts to give rise to at least an inference of a confidential 
relationship. Like the Walker defendant, Respondent-Appellee Jess repeatedly claimed—in 
open court—to having been vested with the very duties inherent in a per se confidential 
relationship, i.e., that of a trustee or administrator of the decedent's estate. To identify just 
a few: 
Q: What did you do with the money? 
A: It's, it's in another account. 
Q: In your name only. 
A: Some, yes, some of the money I have dispersed to relatives as my 
grandmother [intended to]. 
(R. 606; Add. 3, p. 4) (emphasis added). 
Q: So you've got sixty thousand in the checking account. . . [that's] not 
even drawing interest? 
A: I was going to disperse five thousand to each sibling as my 
grandmother requested. 
(R. 606; Add. 3, p. 7) (emphasis added). 
15 
Q: So where did you get the idea that Mr. Olsen was entitled to five 
thousand dollars? 
A: My grandmother told me. 
(R. 606; Add. 3, p. 8) (emphasis added). 
A: My grandmother and I, she was, had had me working on a will, she 
was very specific not only who the money went to, but were here [sic] 
body went to, they did not (inaudible). Cremenated [sic] her. 
Cremendated [sic]. 
(R. 606; Add. 3, p. 11) (emphasis added). 
A: It isn't under any legal obligation to give it to anybody other than my 
grandmother's obligation which is a little higher than legal. I would 
give everybody what my grandma asked me to. 
(R. 606; Add. 3, p. 34) (emphasis added). 
Q: Why did you make that statement? 
A: Because grandma spoke of giving each - certain people money when she 
was still alive. 
Q: So while she was still alive, she indicated to you that she wanted you to 
disburse the money to whom? 
A: She indicated that she wanted to disburse the money. 
Q: She wanted to disburse the money? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And so to whom did she say she wanted to disburse the money? 
A: To different family members. 
(R. 607) (emphasis added). 
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Where Appellee has made statements under oath to holding assets of the decent in trust 
for the purpose of carrying out supposed testamentary wishes, the existence of a confidential 
relationship, or at least inference thereof, cannot be rejected on summary judgment. These 
admissions and expressed intentions required Appellee to act as a fiduciary toward the decent 
and are suggestive of a relinquished control over her own decision making. Contrast Von 
Hake, 705 P.2d at 770. Indeed, in this case, there is more upon which to predicate a 
confidential relationship between the decedent and Appellee than the mere fact of a trustee-
beneficiary situation. See Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Appellees were grandchildren and 
confidants of the decedent, responsible for her complete physical care, active assistors in 
distributing money, and unabashedly intent upon hiding money from the estate immediately 
following her death. (R. 593-600; 736-47.) There is room for the inference of a confidential-
fiduciary relationship notwithstanding the decedent's state of mind. See e.g. Id. (not relying 
upon state of mind or mental faculties in finding the inference of a confidential-fiduciary 
relationship to defeat summary judgment); Walker, All P.2d at 921. 
In ruling that the Appellant, the non-moving party, had failed to establish as a matter 
of law a confidential relationship, the district court therefore improperly granted Appellees' 
summary judgment motions. 
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II. The district court improperly determined that because Appellant failed to 
establish a confidential relationship or undue influence, there was no 
evidence of a contrary intent of the decent at the time the joint bank 
accounts were created. 
Though a presumption of undue influence is predicated upon the finding of a 
confidential relationship, see, Jones, 759 P.2d at 347; Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302, 
extinguishment of rights of survivorship in a joint bank account is not. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-6-104(1), rights of survivorship in a joint account may be extinguished upon a 
showing of "clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is 
created." This does not require evidence of a confidential relationship, undue influence, 
coercion, or even fraud; merely an intent contrary to the concept of survivorship at the time 
of creation. Id. 
In the case of First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Demiris, the Utah Supreme Court construed 
this statute broadly; observing that even absent a finding of mental incompetence or undue 
influence, there was nonetheless sufficient evidence of contrary intent to evince "that the 
ownership of the [monies] remained in [the decedent] and belong[ed] to his estate." 354 P.2d 
97, 99-100 (Utah 1960). Stated the Court, 
[W]e do not say that the evidence so preponderates against the trial court's 
refusal to find that the decedent was incompetent or a victim of undue influence 
that the finding should be reversed. But there is another question to consider: 
in view of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence as to [i] the creation of 
the account, and [ii] the fact that the defendant withdrew the money for her own 
purposes prior to the decedent's death, where was the ownership of that money? 
Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
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In this case, "[ejxcept for the bare fact that a joint tenancy account was opened," there 
was no circumstance to suggest any affirmative intent on the part of the decent to make a gift 
or transfer ownership of the funds outright to Appellee Jess. See Id. at 100. Indeed, this truth 
was never rebutted in the district court, the Appellee having conceded no knowledge of the 
intentions of the decedent in placing her name on the account. (R. 425) (Appellee' Jess' 
Undisputed Fact No. 49: "Nina told Marie she wanted her on the First Utah account but did 
not say why."). Like, the Dem/m-decedent, however, evidence was presented by Appellant 
that the creation of the joint account was for purposes of convenience only; specifically, 
that if anything happened to [the decedent], not necessarily dying, . . . 
[Appellee] Jess [would have] complete access to any of her bank accounts to 
make sure that she [the decedent] could maintain bills, hospital needs, [and] 
whatever else would come up. 
(R. 1121-29 [Claridge Depo. at 34:4-35:2 (emphasis added)]; 598 [Appellee's testimony 
regarding "reimbursement" from decedent.) (Testimony of First Utah Bank Manager Timothy 
Claridge) (emphasis added). Such evidence, in conjunction with the only written testamentary 
instrument issued by the decedent, admissions of a supposed trust-account administered by 
Appellee, supra, and the fact that Appellee "grasped the funds" within hours of the decedent's 
death, while perhaps not conclusive of contrary intent, at least demonstrate a reasonable 
inference thereof. (R. 598-600; 1121-27; Add.3.) 
Having based its decision exclusively on the issue of confidential relationship and/or 
undue influence, the district court therefore improperly adjudicated the matter of contrary 
intent, resolving all inferences in favor of Appellees, the moving parties, and not Appellant. 
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III. The district court was improperly dismissive of certain facts material to 
Appellant's claims and incorrectly drew all inferences in favor of 
Appellees, the moving parties. 
Permeating both the issues of a confidential relationship and the contrary intent of the 
decedent are material inferences of fact expressly and improperly drawn in favor of Appellees 
by the district court. To sustain summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions and 
inferences therefrom, when "reviewed . . . in the light most favorable to the opposing party" 
must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 775 
P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added); Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 368 
P.2d 266,268 (Utah 1962). Where material issues of fact, namely, the admissions of Appellee 
Jess and evidence of the decedent's intent, supra, were either dismissed completely or 
improperly drawn against Appellant by the district court, summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees was improper and the lower court's decision should be dismissed. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant respectfully requests that the decision of the 
district court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees be reversed, and that the Court 
reinstate Appellant's claims for exploitation of confidential relationship, contrary intent of the 
decedent, and the corollary claims of fraud and constructive trust. 
DATED this 2 g * day of October, 2006. 
STRONG & HANNI 
\ ^ / ^ 
Brian C Johnson 
William B. Ingram 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF APRIL 1, 2006 * 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 56 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without sub-
stantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof re-
ferred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judg-
ment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
URCP Rule 56 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004 
NOTES: 
Amendment Notes.-- The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judgment" for "move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor" in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c), deleted "filed 
and served" before "in accordance with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501"; substituted "If for "Should it appear 
to the satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision (g); and made stylis-
tic changes throughout. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References.- Contempt generally, § § 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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All rights reserved 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2006 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2006 UT 46 (8/25/2006), 2006 UT APP 348 (8/24/2006) AND 
SEPTEMBER 1, 2006 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 75 UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 6 NONPROBATE TRANSFERS 
PART 1 MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann § 75-6-104 (2006) 
§ 75-6-104 Right of survivorship 
(1) Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as 
against the estate of the decedent unless theie is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the 
account is created If there are two or more surviving parties, their respective ownerships during lifetime shall be m pro-
portion to their previous ownership interests under Section 75-6-103 augmented by an equal share for each survivor of 
any interest the decedent may have owned in the account immediately before his death, and the right of survivorship 
continues between the surviving parties 
(2) If the account is a P O D account 
(a) On death of one of two or more original payees the rights to any sums remaining on deposit are governed by 
Subsection (1), 
(b) On death of the sole original payee or of the survivor of two or more original payees, any sums remaining on 
deposit belong to the P O D payee or payees if surviving, or to the survivor of them if one or more die before the origi-
nal payee, if two or more P O D payees survive, there is no right of survivorship in event of death of a P O D payee 
thereafter unless the terms of the account or deposit agreement expressly provide for survivorship between them 
(3) If the account is a trust account 
(a) On death of one of two or more trustees, the rights to any sums remaining on deposit are governed by Subsec-
tion (1), 
(b) On death of the sole trustee or the survivor of two or more trustees, any sums remaining on deposit belong to 
the person or persons named as beneficiaries, if surviving, or to the survivor of them if one or more die before the trus-
tee, unless there is clear evidence of a contrary intent, and if two or more beneficiaries survive, there is no right of sur-
vivorship m event of death of any beneficiary thereaftei unless the terms of the account or deposit agreement expressly 
provide for survivorship between them 
(4) In other cases, the death of any party to a multiple-party account has no effect on beneficial ownership of the 
account other than to transfer the rights of the decedent as part of his estate 
(5) A right of survivorship arising from the express terms of the account or under this section, a beneficiary desig-
nation m a trust account, or a P O D payee designation, cannot be changed by will 
HISTORY: C 1953, 75-6-104, enacted by L 1975, ch 150, § 7, 1977, ch 194, § 63 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104 
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NOTES: 
EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENT. -The effect of subsection (1) of this section, when read with the definition of 
"joint account" in § 75-6-101(4), is to make an account payable to one or more of two or more parties a survivorship 
arrangement unless "clear and convincing evidence of a different contention" is offered. 
The underlying assumption is that most persons who use joint accounts want the survivor or survivors to have all bal-
ances remaining at death. This assumption may be questioned in states like Michigan where existing statutes and deci-
sions do not provide any safe and wholly practical method of establishing a joint account which is not survivorship. See 
Leib v. Genesee Merchants Bank, 371 Mich. 89, 123 N. W.2d 140 (1962). But, use of a form negating survivorship 
would make subsection (4) of this section applicable. Still, the financial institution which paid after the death of a party 
would be protected by § § 75-6-108 and 75-6-109. Thus, a safe nonsurvivorship account form is provided. Conse-
quently, the presumption stated by this section should become increasingly defensible. 
The section also is designed to apply to various forms of multiple-party accounts which may be in use at the effective 
date of the legislation. The risk that it may turn nonsurvivorship accounts into unwanted survivorship arrangements is 
meliorated by various considerations. First of all, there is doubt that many persons using any form of multiple name 
account would not want survivorship rights to attach. Secondly, the survivorship incidents described by this section may 
be shown to have been against the intention of the parties. Finally, it would be wholly consistent with the purpose of the 
legislation to provide for a delayed effective date so that financial institutions could get notices to customers warning 
them of possible review of accounts which may be desirable because of the legislation. 
Subsection (3) accepts the New York view that an account opened by "A" in his name as "trustee for B" usually is 
intended by A to be an informal will of any balance remaining on deposit at his death. The section is framed so that ac-
counts with more than one "trustee," or more than one "beneficiary" can be accommodated. Section 75-6-103(3) would 
apply to such an account during the lifetimes of "all parties." "Party" is defined by § 75-6-101(7) so as to exclude a 
beneficiary who is not described by the account as having a present right of withdrawal. 
In the case of a trust account for two or more beneficiaries, the section prescribes a presumption that all beneficiaries 
who survive the last "trustee" to die own equal and undivided interests in the account. This dovetails with § § 75-6-111 
and 75-6-112 which give the financial institution protection only if it pays to all beneficiaries who show a right to with-
draw by presenting appropriate proof of death. No further survivorship between surviving beneficiaries of a trust ac-
count is presumed because these persons probably have had no control over the form of the account prior to the death of 
the trustee. The situation concerning further survivorship between two or more surviving parties to a joint account is 
different. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, 
or title. 
ADDENDUM 3 
(TRO Hearing Transcript) 
Multi-Page 
Hft*ri»9 In the Tell*y Probate Matter 
I Held on 11/05/03 
Fege 1 *age 3 
2 The court! And to what chey're contending 
2 Is, Holly* Is tMt uh, explain M»» Jacks, It that 
3 there's question a* to whether er not you have A right 
4 to control chat money. 
5 K§. Jacks: Dmhm. 
S The court: And *O that whoever has the right 
7 to that money has it available when an ultimate 
• determination 1* &*de en to where the money it supposed 
9 to 90/ it'J ell held there until that determination is 
10 sad* iA oeceaber. Are you opposed to that* 
11 Ms. J«cks: Vm, j'A not, ok* two of the 
IZ eeceunts h*v© been closed* 
19 The Court: Bo when we* that dona? 
14 Ms. Jeckes Right after has death. 
U The Court; When? 
1* Ms. Jacks: Oh the i?th of Decenber-
1? Male: October. 
It Ms. Jack*: October. 
tt *hs Courti 3fota know, I don't know who you 
20 are bat you wexen't talking so excuse nte ma'am, the 
21 17th of October of whet ysar? 
22 Ms, Jack*: Of 2. this year, 2003. 
22 The Court: The 17th of October, and why vera 
24 those account* closed? 
©age 2 
1 The court; Khy then way yoo would you would 
2 be getting signatures from different judges. You've 
3 explained that to *e Mr. Brlncon and T understand* 
4 Mr. BrAnton: ok. 
5 The Court: so. 
( MX* Br in ton: Thank ye* your honor. 
7 The court: Uh, you're in the right place for 
8 talking about a T-A-O, net the probate of the will but 
9 certainly 
16 He, Britcon: That's correct 
11 The courtt The Interim energency release, 
12 And/ what X understand Hz. fcrlnton to be asking for and 
13 you correct: If X'ft *ro*g, i f chat toothing Is touched or 
14 dispersed until there i s a fornel hearing. 
15 He. fcrinton; That's* that's correct* 
16 The Court: Is that correct? xre you apposed 
17 to that *a*aA? 
It Ms. Jacket Uh, year Honor, the accounts that 
19 he's asking to be frozen are actually en account with 
20 myself and ny grandmother, *• were a Joint account with 
21 Ae as the right of survlvocehip end 
22 Th* Court: Nell that ramai** to be seen. 
23 That's one of Che issues of probate isn't i t council? 
2* Mr- B tin too-. That's correct. 
1 Ms. Jacks: ua, tjioy wore aecounts that were 
2 in, both of out nab*** my grandmother's and my own. 
3 The Court: What did you do with the noney? 
4 Ms. Jacks: It'*, i t ' s in another account. 
5 The Court; m jwt name only. 
6 Ms. jacks: S^^y«a^aomeMoi^tJt^iw^y-13 
1 •ht**Ldl*per*ed; t(?-x«lativ«rref *m7 gxaSMmotherv' 
0 The court: r©« had no right to disperse 
9 anything until the probate occurred. That's the 
30 problem and 1 assume Mr- ficincon that's why you filed 
11 this. Is that correct? 
32 Mr. Bciaton: That's correet. 
13 The court: Tou don't have the right to 
14 disperse noney until there's a probace. And I don't 
15 n**» to be unkind Mx. Jacks but, my ones* is ttoac you 
lo did not Xnow that bot that noney i t going to have to be 
17 re-captured and put into a bank account in escrow and 
It held until the probate in thin case takes piece 
19 December 3rd. you don't have the right to close 
20 account* And to decide who yoo give noney to. St has 
21 to go through a Judge and probate orders hove to be 
22 signed. How much money did you take out? 
23 Ms Jacks: Moll there's sixty thousand 
24 dollar* in the account. 
25 The court: In what account? 
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He. Jacks: In, i n 
The Court: In the one that you haven't 
e loped. 
Me. Jacks, In the , in the account chat I 
trans f erred. 
The Court: Vet ne try again . You s a id there 
were 3 account* 
Kf • Jacks: Correct, e CO. 
The Court: What, where i s the CD Account* 
Ms. Jacks I t has been transferred i n t o uh. 
an account with on eiy name. 
The Court i ifhere? 
Ms. jacks: KLrst Utah Bank. 
The court: ( inaudible) 
Ms. Jacks: Everything i s a t F i r s t ©tab Bank. 
The Court*, f i r s t Utah Bewt has 
Ms. Jacks* X have the account numbers for 
you. 
The Court: Just a -sonant, w e ' l l get to that . 
F i r s t vtah Bank now has a c o m your HUM l a the eaount 
of s i x t y thousand dol lars? 
Ms. Jacks: F i f ty thousand your honor. 
The Court: r l f t y thousand, ana there was 
s i x t y , i s that correct? 
Ms. Jacks: Mo, the CD was for f i f t y . 
Page * 
The Court: Ok, what other accounts are 
there? 
Ms Jacks: And then there was a savings 
account. 
The Court: Where was that a l s o ? 
Ms* Jacksr They're a l l a t F i r s t trtah Bank. 
retnale Where was that? 
Ms. Jacks: At F i r s t Utah Bank. 
The Court: I t u»* a t F irs t Vtah Bank? 
Ms. Jacks: Tee. 
The Court: And you $utt l e f t i t e t the same 
hank hot put i n your name only? 
Ms. Jecks: correc t . 
The court: And t h i s i s inappropriate chat's 
by t h i s T-K-o has been r e v e s t e d , so there was a 
second CD? 
Ms. Jacks: no, oh, a savings account* 
The Court: ok, a savings account, and how 
aoch was i n that? 
Ms. Jacks: And that was uh, t e n thousand 
d o l l a r s . 
The court: Ok, and that i s now i n what form 
and where? 
Ms. Jacks: i t i s a l so in ny efcecklaoe 
























































so you've got s i x t y thousand i n 
in your nans? or a savings 
I t ' s in a checkings account. 
A checking account? That not J 
even drawing in teres t? 
m Jacks: I t waygoings£Ojdls peraejf iye 
'^Sbusand^to^eaeh.sibling«a*_myj*jra*dnothar requested? 
The Court: wel l l e t me f i n i s h . The th ird 
account or , veh ic le foe money where, what was 
Ms. Jacks: 









i s that correct? 
Ms. Jacks: 
The Court* 
I s s t i l l i n a checkings account 
i s that a t F i r s t . 
F ir s t vtah Bank. 
And bow much i s In i t ? 
Ch, four thousand d o l l a r s . 
And that i s in a checking or 
checkings. 
These are a l l checking Accounts, 
y e s . And t h a t ' s . 
Bo we have CDs anymore, we don't 
have savingt account! where in teres t could be earned. 
Instead everything i j > i s a checking account In your 
nane only i s that r ight? 
Mi Jacks: 
The Court: 












was working on a. 
The Court: 
That i s correc t . 
Have you dispexsed any of t h i s 
1 have. 
Mow much has you dispersed and to 
Uh, f ive thousand dollar* t o Cus 
Who's he? 
My grandmother's nephew. 
Have you looked a t a w i l l ? 
Me were i n the process . 
Have you looked a t a w i l l ? 
Hot i l e g a l w i l l , your honor, 1 
So where did you ge t the idea that 
Mr, Olson was e n t i t l e d t o f i v e thousand dol lars? 
Ms. Jacks: 
The Court: 
'M^gxanto^er' to ld^iM^ 
s o you don't look to see i f 
t h e r e ' s a w i l l , you don't get council o r advise , you 




Unt, we l l . 
What torn did. you give i t t o him? 
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MF. Jeers: 2 wrote e check your honor. 
the court: flbo elso have yo« diiperaed aooey 
M*. Jacks: Uh, ftdmond Tolley. 
f The Court: Who is bo? 
ft Ms. Jock*: Be is « grandson* 
9 The Court: Bow nuch have you given him? 
i Ms. Jocko: Ono thousand dollars. 
§ The court: ho* much? 
JO Ms. jocks: One thousand. 
\ \ the court: And again, you haven* t looked at 
12 a will. Mho also have you given money* 
13 Ms. Jacks: Uh* that's oil. 
14 The Court: so you've dispersed the total of 
15 six thousand dollar*. 
2ft M*. Jocks: Corroet xoo (inaudible) 
1? The Court: except that you've pat everything 
18 e l s e in your name la that eorrectT 
19 Ho. Jock*: I t wot already l a my name that I 
20 put I t e x c l u s i v e l y l a my aa»e. 
21 The court: I t was 1B the IUUBO of the 
22 decedent and you 
23 Ks. Jacks: And no. Exactly. 
24 Tho court: Ml r ight . 
23 Ma. Jacks: The money.. 
1 M*. Brlnten: wo l c does not your honor. 
t ThO Court: Great! 
3 Mo Jacks: Yes I t does Ob 
4 Th* Court; You don't have the w i l l aa 'aa . 
ft Ms. Jocks: (inaudible) 
$ Tho Court: now 00 you knew? 
? Mo, Jacks: Bat ney J jus t *«y one Thing to» 
9 verify.* 
9 Tho Court: let*. 
10 MS. Jocks; Yen. My grandmother end J, she ^  
11 «*»« hod hod »e working on % will, she vet very 
12 specific not only oho tho noaoy vent to,? but where here* 
13 body vent to, thoy did not (inaudible). creikeneted 
14 her- Cranoiiatod* 
13 Male: creAated. 
1ft Ms. Jacks: cremated hor. 
l i t Tho Court: tod s i r , i t I hear out moro word 
18 you* ro out of th* courtroom, I don't know who you ere 
23 but you don't haw a voico in this courtroom. 
20 Ms. Jacks: And, and. 
21 The Court: He's an Attorney, are you an 
22 attorney? 
23 Hale: 1 know, hars tho 090 that called mo 
24 horo. 
25 Ms. Jncka: Ho calls her. 
Pace 11J 
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1 Tho Court: How, s t o p . I'm granting tho 
2 temporary res tra in ing order* Al l of the roads oro to 
3 bo pot i h escrow, uh, council swy conclude i t bo put i a 
4 escrow oh, through your law f i r a , none of than oro to 
$ bo touched or tampered with un, thoy oro t o drow 
( i n t e r e s t where i t i t 1» t CD form or savings account 
? toxn, or whatever so that we're not toasting Che 
0 opportunity to add to what fteney e x i s t s . The f ive 
3 thousand do l lars to Mr. Olson i s to ho recovered ana 
10 pat i n t o the t rusc account or escrow account oa i s th* 
21 one thousand d o l l a r s , waiting for * determination in 
22 December of how the oioney i s t o be dispersed, in the 
13 meantime* uh, none e l tho funds oro to be taken out ot 
14 tho bonk account that i s i n your aeiee, u», council w i l l 
25 moot with you on order v l l l ho signed by me 
16 immediately, and the money i s not yours t o touch at 
1? t h i s point , that remains tho subject of the probate 
1ft ac t ion s o t for t r i a l in Decenibor. 3 don't think you 
1$ swont to do anything unlawful hue you do not have the 
20 r loht to simply take th i s , those assets without even 
21 iooki.no at a w i l l and e l l l y n i l l y de l iver them to 
22 people , council do you have 0 copy of w i l l ? 
23 Mr. Br i n ton: Yes 1 do your honor. 
24 The court : Does i t oven stake provision tor 
25 those two people I n inherit? 
1 Mole: Ke c e l l e d BWJ bare and told no that 1 
2 needed to cone talk t o you. 
3 The Court: X didn't ask you t o speak, s i t 
4 gu le t ly p l ease . 
$ Ms. Jacks: And I did notlf* or contact two 
ft attorneys before touching that laoney. 
7 xhe court: Mho's that? 
9 MS- Jacks: it I t ' s in writ ing, survival 
3 {inaudible) 
10 The Court: Ma'an, you don't have the r loht 
11 to disperse to money where a w i l l i s involved. And the 
12 w i l l does not have a provision, e spec ia l ly for those 
13 people t o inher i t any noney. 
14 Mo. Jacks: correct The way. 
23 The Court: Council, #0 what i s your 
1ft understanding, when was the v l l l drafted by whom, i s i t 
2? signed. 
18 Mr. ftrinton: if 2
 m y approach the bench, 
13 The Court: you bet. 
20 Mr. 3rinton: This will's doted April 13th, 
21 2392. This is the only known vlll* this is the will 
22 that's been submitted to probate that will come for 
23 formal probate proceeding on the 3rd of December. 
The Court: In December t give, devise and 
bequeath all »y property both real and personal 
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whosesoever the same may be s i tuated to my chi ldren, 
Kenneth John K i l l e r , Donald Ray Tolley, and sheryl Lynn 
&la*edale<?t end equal share, 1 do hereby name. 
c o n s t i t u t e and Appoint my chi ldren, Kenneth John 
Millar, Donald Ray Tol lvy , end Sheryl Lynn B©«lsdela<?) 
or the survivor of them to be the executor of t h i s ny 
l a s t w i l l and testament* e t ce tera , e t ce tera , e t c e t e r e . 
Me* 11 make you a copy of t h i t . You do not have the 
right m»'«m, to d isperse any of the money, you ere not 
according t o th i s l a * t v l l l and testament, there may be 
e l e t e r one end i f yeu*ve got i c , you can produce i t a t 
the time of the t r i a l in December, there i * no bas i s 
for yoo to be involved an* a* the personal 
representat ive i t a l l , you should not be In charge of 
the money, you c e r t a i n l y should not be d ispers ing . 
Ms. Jacks: Can 2. 
The Court: you have e quest ion. 
Ms Jacks: XI ny grandmother put the money 
in my account, she, here ' s e l e t t e r from our bank. Do 
you vent t h i s ? 
The Court: No. 
Ms. Jecks: If my grandmother put a, t h i s 
money i n t o an account with my name, leaving me *s the 
survivor, r ight of survivorship. 
The court: That i s n ' t whet the f i l l s a y s , do 
Page 14 
you have a w i l l * 
Ms. Jacks: l a ma'am. X have the accounts in 
my name in the bank. 
The Court: That i s not the seme. 
Ms. Jacks: somebody'9 s i t t i n g there and 
talking to ny grandmother that they. 
The Court: Vet me explain something to you, 
ma'am. you have the r ight to put on a l l evidence of 
whet you b e l i e v e the f a c t s and circumstances vera, but 
in the meantime it* s my xespons ib l l l ty and duty t o make 
sure that those a s sv t s are not dispersed or ge t t ing to 
people who have no r ight t o them. Those people era not 
mentioned to what appears to be the only tr i l l . And 
you've already shown that you're not paying any 
a t tent ion t o the w i l l , or f iduciary r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
tha t ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for accounting for monies by 
dispersing monies, s i x thousand dol lar* t o two people 
vho era not named in the w i l l and you're acting a* e 
personal representat ive in essence and yoo're not the 
personal representat ive according to the w i l l in 
addit ion, yea have caftan some s i x t y thousand c o l l a r s 
that was in the decedent's name and perhaps yours as 
ve i l* 2 don't know, and you put i t a l l i n yours which 
i s contrary to the laws of probate, counci l , i f you'd 



















































the temporary restraining order, I ' l l s ign i t . 
M*. Jacks: Did you not vaot to see the l i s t 
fInaudible). 
The court: Dot today, no- The only i s sue i s 
urn, whether or not temporary res tra in ing order i s 
appropriate today. 
ns . Jacks: on the money that {inaudibleI by 
my grandmother. 
The Court: {inaudible) no! On a l l of the 
a s s e t s of hex e s t a t e . And you don't lose in th i s 
becauso i f you're l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to the money in 
December, that w i l l be determinad but we don't )u»t 
take money whon somebody d ie s and throw i t around. 
There has to be a l ega l determlnttlon of where the 
money i s supposed to go, t h a t ' s the purpose of probate. 
or the proceeding.* that follow soneoaa's death to 
determine where t h e i r a s s e t s go . And the document that 
we look to when we go through probate i s the w i l l , so 
If th i s I s the v u i , and there i s no other w i l l , then 
t h i s d ic tates how the money i s to be dispersed, any 
i s s u e s you've g o t can be raised at the time of t r i a l . 
This ju s t protects the money. 
Ms. Jacks: But tb* monay was mine. The 
money <inaudible) 
Tha court) The remains, ma'am. 
Ms. Jacket I'm not . 
The Court: I'm not going to argue with you. 
That remains to be seen, i f yoo want to show ne the 
document you can, b e t at t h i s point in t i n e , you don't 
have the legal authority to take any money. *eo have 
given away s i x thousand do l lars to people who are not 
n e i r s ; you have not done t h i s court authority. You 
have not done t h i s cons i s t ent with the w i l l ; you were 
not the personal representat ive . You want to hand me 
the document ( inaudib le ) . 
Ms. Jacks: No, i t , she {inaudible) . 
The Court: 1 don' t want anything from you 
for Just e moment p l ease . {Inaudible) There was only. 
counc i l , you've alluded t o check number 109 i n the 
amount of seventy f i ve thousand do l lars . Uh, I'm not 
sure t h a t ' s accurate according to what she says . Um. 
Mr. Bclntoh: I have a copy of the check your 
honor. 
The Court: Ok, so seventy f ive thousand 
do l lar s was tefcen. 
Mr. Brlnton: That's , that ' s correct . 
<inaudiblef approach. 
The court: Whet about that? 
Ms. Jacka. If you look e t the checks that 
have b»en written, you honor, she was s t i l l a l i v e . 
?age IS 
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1 The Court; I asked you, I asked yon what 
2 money you had taken/ what money yog had moved, have 
3 you deal t with seventy f ive thousand dol lars rather 
4 than the s i x t y - f e e t or the s ixty-nine? 
$ Ms, JOCK*: NO your honor, my grandmotner did 
5 chat. My grandmother whi le she we* a l ive 
? Mr, Brinton: <inaudible) Tftl* transfer did 
8 occur approximately three weeks before her death. 
9 The Court: 6o seventy Civ* thousand dollars 
10 wee put in F ir s t utoh Bank, I t doesn' t fay anything 
11 about tin, (inaudible) M#. Jeffs<?), nothing a t a l l , 
12 there i s a l so a l e t t e r , i t reference* j o i n t account* 
13 may or nay not be accurate and i t references account* 
14 for 2 -1 -3 - l -S -0 -5 -7 -2 -0 -0 -1 -4 -3 -4 -3 2 - 0 - l - l - 3 - $ - 8 - 3 and 
15 it'* dated today's date which means that those nay b« 
lo the account* that ax© presently, in fact, chat would ba 
17 what one would assume set up. 
It N T . fcrlnteo: Correct. 
It The court; i»ot the one* that were left by 
20 the decedent. At which may ox may not have been in 
21 joint tenancy. Vb, hot at this juncture, ub, there are 
22 three separate accounts, tat ma have you amend by 
23 inner llneatlon you're signing the order council and 
j?4 I'll sign it. so chat ail monies are, oh, pot la your 
23 trust aeeonat in escrow, not touched, not 1* any way 
1 The Court: Hall, you are going to need to 
2 yet a waiver front that other person, «h, or they have 
3 an equal right it seems to be to serve in that 
4 capacity. 
5 Mr. Brinton: Correct. 
6 The Court: so w* need to amend thie and you 
7 can come directly to me to add the other child ox the 
8 decadent that's living or, urn, get a waiver. 
• Kr Brinton: ox 
10 The Court: Do you want to amend that alao? 
11 Mr. brinton: Would ypu like me to take u» 
12 back end type up the order Cineodiblel. 
13 The court: I'm afraid that if we don't get 
14 something dona today that you can take to the hank 
1$ today, that we're going to have problems. 
16 Mr Br in con: I agree. Or. 
17 The courts Thie is the very reason villa ace 
18 written, and wa don't rely on people orally talking 
19 about what somebody may hove wanted. Uh, a will has to 
20 be inviting to be viehle 
21 Ms. Jacks: He were working on a will 
22 the Court: Wall it did net Unaudible) done. 
23 5o chat the will that's in effect Is the one that 
24 council has produced. 
25 Ms- Jacks: But you have telling yoo what she 
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1 interfered with unt i l ve h«ve a f u l l blown hearing 
2 where everyone gets a chance to put on their f u l l case. 
3 in addition to the three bank accounts that are l i s t e d , 
4 i t sounds l i k e there i s a l so a f i ve thousand dol lars 
5 t h a t ' s be^n dispersed t o Cos Olson that needs to be 
6 recovered and a thousand do l lars dispersed to Edmund 
? trolley that needs to be recovered, and who doe* the 
8 w i l l provide for as personal representative? 
9 Mr. Brinton: The three children of the 
30 decedent. 
U TJie Court: The they're a l l a l ive? 
22 Mr ferinton: Actually, the parent, you 
13 parent, your father i s Kenneth, he i s deceased, they're 
14 two remaining children s t i l l a l i v e . One of then i s 
13 Donald Kay r o l l e y who has retained us k» council and 
16 who has appointed special administrator of the es tate 
17 by order ot Judge Pratto yesterday. 
18 the Court: That's what you were working on. 
19 Mr- firlnton: Correct. 
20 The Court: Ok, a l l r ight, he i s ^M of two 
21 people who have the r igh t to serve in the capacity. 
22 Mr. Srlnten: That's correct . 
,2* "rt»e Coatf. l a the*, correct/) <£*» The other 
24 person waived the r ight t o serve in the capacity? 
25 Ms. Brinton: Not waived, ve your honor 
1 wanted. 
2 The Court: no, X don't think t asked that , 1 
3 was explaining that uh, a w i l l d ic ta tes how an e s t a t e 
4 i s to be divided. 
5 Ms. Jacks: And her actions by putt ing that 
6 money i n t o en account wich me as the right o f survivor. 
T The Court: X not » 9 r » she, that remains t o 
8 be seen. 
9 Ms Jacks: Ok, hut when that's (inaudible) 
10 that shows that her intentions were not for oon enc> 
11 sheryl to be executor of her estato 
12 The Court: do you're seying that hvt putting 
13 something in joint tenancy. 
14 M S . Jacks« with the right of survivorship. 
15 The Court: Means that that over comes the 
16 wiU. 
1? Ms. Jacks: Means that that money does not 
10 become part of that estate. 
1° The court: well, if in fact you can prove 
20 that and that there has been no coercion, harassed, 
21 e tce tera . 
22 Ms. Jacks: <inaudible> Wa can abso lute ly . 
*> The Cetttt* XA©. the signature on the check i s 
24 about as f rag i l e and looks l i k e the signature of 
2$ someone who may be incompetent. 
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Ms* Jacks: on you know, ok.. «• can prove 
it-
3 The Court: 2 an not going to Argue with you. 
Vou have the right to hire an attorney* and if 2 were 
you, uh* 2 suggest you look into that. 
Ms. Jacks: ve have an *ttomey we Just 
didn't have tin*. 
The Court: who Is it? 
Ms. Jacks: Paul* somebody I'd like to right 
after grandma died, wn© told ne. 
The court: You know the attorney's name? 
Ms. JACKS: Peal Br«iner, or. 
The court: Who? 
Ms. Jacks: I, I'd have to look It up. 
The Courtt Whet you nay want to do Is show 
the attorney the will. 
Mr. Tolley: xour honor* nay 1 ask one 
question to you? 
The Court: kes, who ate your 
Mr. Tolley: I an hex brother and I'd like 
The courti Stand up please. 
Mr. trolley: I'm the person who took care of 
net til the day sho died, she lived in my home. umr 
in January of 2003, and this z know to be hearsay but, 
uh, ny# another one of my uncles Kent down and had A 
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1 helpful in explaining hov this works, koo have the 
2 right to demand production of ell documents that nave 
3 to do with the estate you (inaudible). And If another 
i Mill was written, there was «o»t be two witnesses 
5 Kr Tolley: Right* that's what Z was going 
6 to ask. can the witnesses come in and, and testify 
1 The Couec: sure. 
e Mr Tolley: That they witnessed the, signing 
$ and notarization of that will* 
10 The Coort My understanding is yes* they can 
11 come in and they can talk about what they saw, they 
12 cannot calk about what they heard. 
13 Mr. Tolley: correct. 
If The Court* So if they saw aonebody sign and 
15 they saw a will drafted* we still don't have the will, 
14 but, you have then saying that Another will was drafted 
27 then the problem becomes establishing what that other 
Is will said. 
19 He. Tolley: Ok, that WAS my question, that 
2D what 2 wanted to est. 
[21 The Court. It's a good que ft ion. And this 
22 does not (take any decisions, I tr*en, I am not waking 
23 any decisions today on what happens to the money or 
24 who's going to get it. Except to say that it's not 
25 going to be dispersed until everybody has a right to a 
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new w i l l wri t ten up and notarised. 
The Court: i t there ' s another w i l l , bring i t 
i n . 
Mr. Tolley: Correct* how do we go about 
finding a copy of the t one? 
The Court: 1 can' t t e l l you chat, e l l 1 can 
t e l l you i s that whoever vitna-ssed i t might have « copy 
of i t , or there i s there ' s A place where documents were 
kept, family documents were kept, family documents* a 
secur i ty . 
Mr. Tol ley: So these aren' t f i l e d with the 
court anywher** anything l i k e that? 
The Court,: »o, w i l l s are general ly not f i l e d 
with the courts u n t i l probate occurs 
Mr. Tolley: Because there ' s another w i l l 
that Don Tol ley had; a copy of that we no longer have, 
tha t ' s what we're looking for t o . 
The Court: Kail* i f there ' s another w i l l 
that becoaes extremely important. 
Mr. Tolley: (Inaudible) . 
The Court: And like you say, you're question 
or your promise is going to be tracking it down 
{Inaudible} but you can certainly offer testimony about 
that on the day of the hearing, um, you have the right 
to do discovery* and attorney would be extreately 
1 say so. This is the not the kinds of thing that you 
2 would want to Mr. Tolley* or you would want (&a'a», 
3 somebody coning in end just taking a big hunk of money 
4 end throwing it at different people* that isn't how it 
$ works. How le works is the court ia involved so that 
e everybody is treated fairly. And to take large hunks 
1 of money end give then eway without court approval* 
9 without notifying other benefielaries is totally 
9 Improper. And »o what we're doing is holding onto the 
10 money not for anyone iA particular person's benefit so 
11 that a meaningful fair determine ticn can be nade after 
12 all the evidence including looking at any and all wills 
13 if there'! more than one will, and then a decision can 
14 be made but the httmey will still be there. IX this 
15 order were not in place frankly I'm convinced that it 
16 would be gone, or a large part of it would be gone by 
1? December, six thousand dollars of It, was given away 
Id yesterday or something, and another sixty four thousand 
19 was pat in your sister's name. 
20 Mr. Tolley: Yone of it goes but I was there 
21 The Court: 2 understand. And what I'm 
22 saying is why should she have greater rights than you 
23 or the Other poople and remains 
24 Kr. Tolley: My grandmother told ae to let 
25 her do i t 
Page 24 
'age 21 - Page 24 DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC (801) 328-1188 
Multi-Page TM 
Faqe 23 
2 The Court: well, your grandmother asy have 
2 said I t but that's not whet the v i l l does. 
3 >tt. Tc\l%y*. 1 Xnc*. Ul*»*ik**> 
4 The Court* Uh, we're oolnq to have • full 
5 bearing where everybody gets * chenee to put on their 
6 evidence, council, you've c/ot ell the proceeds fro* 
? the check tod you've got quotes it looks like around 
$ the beginning of the checks you've got quote marks on 
9 the end of check of two? 
10 Hele: That** fiao ae e capital!eed tera. 
U (Inaudible) In paragraph « 1 believe. 
12 The Court: Uh, said macro* account draw* 
13 interest, 1* that correct? 
14 Male: Correct. 
13 The Coast: I'll just grab that. 
It Kale: Ok. 
17 the Court; That** another problem if it'* in 
l« a checking account it'* not drawing Interest which is 
15 to everyone's detriment. You actually 90c (inaudible). 
20 And I'm adding, and this is the subject to disposition, 
21 ex a trial or a hearing presently »*t for Dacenbe* 3rd. 
22 Course, that's subject to change if it's a date thac'p 
23 not viable and (Inaudible\* 
24 Male: We've received notie* (inaudible) 
23 The Court: (Inaudible) received. <Inaudible) 
Page 2? 
1 can strike the tearing date otherwise we'll give you * 
2 hearing, on • date can be designated. Does anybody have 
S Bjciw objection. It th.au want e. tattle etc tht* to q.o in 
4 beyond the 10 days? 
5 Mr. Briotea: 100 your honor. 
6 The Court: 06 you have any objection to 
? going beyond the 10 days? 
9 Ms Jacks: Re would like to apeak with an 
9 attorney* 
10 The court* Well you are entitled to speak 
11 with an attorney and I've urged you co do so. And, 
12 you'll need to know the attorney's last name to contact 
13 him. 
14 Ms. jacks: <inaudible) your honor. 
1$ The Court: but, uh, what X'n asking now iar 
1$ do you have any objection to having the hearing which 
11 would give you ftore time to talk to the attorney note 
IB than 10 days from now? Wnac we're trying to do is 
19 figure out a time. Bow about the 20th at 2*30 that's 
20 pore than 10 days. 
21 Mr. Br in ton J That's fii>e for us your honor. 
at The court: is that acceptable, yes or no? 
29 Ms. Jacks: we'll be out of town your honor. 
24 The courc: When axe you going out of town? 
23 Ms* Jacket On the 13th. 
Pege 26 
1 And I've added the following language is draw council/ 
2 ub, paragraph 2, the court u«« amended said, the 
3 peel doner ha© shown e threat of immediate and 
4 irreparable harm to the estate based on evidence that, 
3 l'n gonna put Ms. Jacks, Ms. Jesse's statements 
6 indicate that funds nay have been fraudulently 
7 transferred and were definitely dispersed to two 
9 individuals that are hot listed as beneficieries in cha 
9 will and are likely in immediate danger of being 
10 liquidated. Ok, we need to set up the hearing on this, 
11 uh, that's not on the ultimate issue of who gets the 
22 Z&oney, that's not even on the ultimate issue of whether 
13 there are other wills although if you have evidence of 
14 that you can bring it in, what the hearing will be 
13 concerning is whether or not this temporary restraining 
16 order, which Is just What it says, it's temporary, and 
It It restrains everybody* not just the two of you, but 
10 everybody from tampering with the money so 1c' s there 
19 to be divided fairly by the court in e way that the 
20 «<iXl or oh, the decedent wanted it distributed and the 
23 * L U would be the best indication of that. The hearing 
22 therefore would be a short hearing and if you agree 
23 that tne money can just be held, uh, pending the trial 
24 in December which isn't that far away, it's !•** than a 
23 month away, uU, you can talk to council about it and wt 
1 Tne court: Well, there's no way we can do it 
t between now and the 13tb. 
3 Ms. Jacks: Right. 
4 The Court; The 11th is a holiday, ©or 
$ schedule is totally booked for tomorrow and Friday and 
6 also for uh, Monday, Wednesday and then you go out of 
? town Thursday, is that correct? 
• Ms. Jacks: correct, Thursday evening. 
f The court: When do you cent back? 
It Ms. Jacks: on the 21st. 
11 the court: Well, didn't we say we had tine 
22 she 13th during the dey, or not? 
13 Ms. Jacks: Wo, (inaudible) 
14 The court: The 20th-
13 Ms Jacks: {inaudible) 
16 Tho court: And you won't be beck til the 
1? 2tst« is that correct? «a» on tit* 2lat.» vrn kav* *RW 
18 tin*? 
19 Ms. Jacks: it '9 our, (inaudible). 
29 The Courtt what about the 26th? 
21 Ms. Jacks; Oh, we (inaudible) 
22 Tne Court: we could do i t 26cb, on the 26th 
23 if you'fe willing to waive the 10 day requirement but 
24 that is actually to point out the obvious only, 
25 4,5,6,7,days a week, before the trial where you'd qet e 
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1 full hearing on everything (inaudible) and part of the 
interim, the tin* beween the two dates i* 
^ Thanksgiving so you ea» cover, uh, your attorney call 
« ui it you change your mind bat what: I'm asking for now 
5 Is 
4 Ma. Jacks: { inaudib le ) . 
? The Court: i s *ft indicat ion of whether or 
6 not you want & hearing before the December 3rd t r i a l or 
9 whether you're w i l l i n g t o go along with chat date . 
0 Me. Jacks! I'm w i l l i n g to wait u n t i l the 
1 3rd. 
2 The court: And. t h a t ' s agreeable t o you. 
3 Mr. Bzinton: That i s your honor. 
4 T»» courts I s that agreeable to you s i r ? 
5 Mr. Tol ley i Uh, ye** but we ceo have the 
6 attorney change I t i f need**? 
? The Courtt xeu can have the attorney c a l l us 
ft and w e ' l l try t o f ind another cay, the problem we've 
w got I s you see* Oecenfeer 3rd ian* t even a month away 
0 and your s i s t e r , X guess i t ' s your s i s t e r , i s going to 
1 be gone for a part of the interim time, yes you ean 
"2 have the attorney c a l l us and we ' l l see what we ean 
:3 work out. If th is were a s i tua t ion part of my job I s 
:4 to protect both t i d e s ^xt& where you're not represented, 
:S I want to make sure you understand, so I'm gonna bend 
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1 that's going to be eesily worked out, you know that 
2 it's going to require a long long trial or a lengthy 
3 trial of more than a few hours, then what you nay want 
4 to do is well in advance of December 3rd, give my clerk 
5 Michelle, talk togethex and we'll try to get you a 2ion 
t date foz a hearing before that time. I'm not going to 
? make you wait until the 3cd, if it looks like it's not 
8 going to be resolved. Does that make sense, any 
9 questions front anybody? Yes sic, 
10 Mr. Tolley: one question, are they going to 
11 start notifying us to things like this, the court dates 
12 and stuff, and hour and a half ago, two hours ago when 
13 2 was called is the first time that J_tlnaudible> 
14 Th« Court: Xes let me explain why that is. 
15 This is what is called an emergency relief. A regular 
IE probata natter, where people look at a will or look at 
11 a situation where somebody dies with property without a 
19 will, and they decide how the property is to be 
19 dispersed, gets a regular trial date if people can't 
20 agree. And you, every beneficiary, every potential 
21 beneficiary's given notice and yes, you would know, the 
22 teafon you didn't get notice on this of more than an 
23 hour or BO is because this is an emergency situation. 
24 That's why it's called a temporary lestrainlng order. 
25 (ih, It's only temporary and it's stopo action for a 
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* over backwards and explain this to you. Sou're sot 
2 losing anything on this* this is not a situation where 
3 for a year, six months or even foor months, «r even two 
4 months you don't have access to the money and you can't 
5 get a resolution of this. This is a short tern deal, 
€ of less than 30 days so, we're fortunate in that it's 
7 turning around so fast and we've got to double check 
ft with Judge fretto and make sure it's on-his calendar 
9 with Che 3rd for a trial. Because, my cuees is thee 
0 what is going to happen Is on the 3rd, it's the regular 
.1 probate calendar. 
2 Mr. Sriatcn? correct 
3 The Court; Mhera about 20 or 3D cases are 
4 set. And it won't be the hoaxing date, the hearing 
$ will come back to ma if it's not resolved on the 
e probate calendar and it maybe, uh* so, obviously if 
-T it's not resolved on the 3rd, you can call us and we'll 
e immediately set It up. 
.9 Kr. Brintom Ok. 
4 The Court; is that agreeable? And then if 
3 you want your attorney if yaa 9«t somebody involved and 
:2 you want to try to find an earlier date, we'll try to 
:3 do that as well. Nobody's losing enything today What 
time is the probate (inaudible)? flow if you talk to 
our lewyaz, and you know that this is not something 
1 very brief period of time. The reason that council 
2 chose that route and 2 guess 1 could him speak for 
3 himself, but* the reason is so that the assets were not 
4 taken away before we had a hearing to see who was 
5 entitled co the assets, t don't know. I can't remember 
€ hex name, and I don't know why it's so hard, maybe Ms 
7 Jeffs is the one who gsts everything but 1 have to see, 
8 and council has the right to examine the witnesses, 
9 your attorney has the right to examine them, we hav© to 
10 see by who by law is entitled and that's why we're 
11 setting It over_ 
12 Mr. rolley; He explained it very well to us. 
13 The court: He did? 
14 Mr. Telley: Re did. He was actually., 
15 The Court: He's a very fine lawyer. 
16 Mr. Tolley: *e don't have a problem with 
1? him, it's his ellent 
18 The court: Well, and, uh, the client is going 
39 to be controlled when the client comes to court and uh, 
20 everyone is going to be treated fairly and no decision 
21 is going to be made today that's irrevocable in other 
22 words, this is temporary solution until we can get all 
23 of the fects out and give everyone a chance and right 
24 now what it says is December 3rd, and we're gonna make 
25 you a copy of it. St said 9 o'elock But as council 
P«ge 321 
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1 Aay have already told you, that hearing oh, en the 3rd 
2 of, December ia not going t* he e trial , uh» I initially 
3 did not speak clearly about this, uh, 2 wa* confused 
4 about hi* case chat was Judge Fratto's or mine. 8a is 
5 what wo c a l l a probate Judge, end c h a t ' s sojteching t h a t 
6 r o t a t e * i r o n Judge t o Judge and a t t h e nrane&t* ha hears 
7 e l l the probate eases. But if there'* a problem on a 
g probate case, *nd I chink we're looking «t a pzoblem in 
» thia ca»e, we're looking at & di*pute in any event, 
10 i t 'a probably going to require a long hearing or * 
11 t r i a l which wean* i t cone* back t o ft* because 1'it the 
12 e e s l g n o d j u d g e . And y o u ' l l have adequate t i n e and 
13 n o t i c e t o prepare 5o *h*n you t a l k t o your lawyer , 
14 t a l k about the d a t e o f December 3rd and exp la in m a t 
15 chat la just, have your attorney call council and he'll 
16 g i v e you a card today, I should s a y , Mr Brinton w i l l 
1? g i v e you a card today* And then Mr. Brinton can 
19 expl&Ln what your a t t o r n e y w i l l a l r e a d y nnderstand and 
19 that the 3td ia only for a summary or eaay resolution-
20 Axe you ok? 
21 Mr. Telley: i*m Juet having a little aathma 
22 Attack, 2 ok. 
23 The Court; I'm *orry, can we do aomething tot 
24 you? 
25 Mr Tolley: Can I have a glaaa of water? 
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1 The Court: Hell, i t you do that, yoo'U find 
2 youf*elf in a trap. 
3 Ma. Jack*: Right / I'm s a y i n g , a f t e r we g e t 
4 thia taken care or. 
5 Hr T o l l e y ; * o , n o , r i g h t . My, » y 
6 grandmother' a personally told m* that abe vented 
? aomething, ahe was very blunt and forward and you did 
a i t , JO. 
9 Th% Court: Yea, fcrat the lav require* that., 
JO uh, when somebody pn**e* on t h e i r property where 
11 deals** about poaslng on their property needa to be in 
12 w r i t i n g for the property proceeds and what we c a l l , an 
13 e a t a t e ftanor, where there i a no w i l l , but here t h e r e l a 
14 a t l e a * t one w i l l , 2 d o n ' t know whether thero are 
15 other* or not And, putting in joint tenancy la a 
1$ legal issue that I would want to look at more closely 
17 but X don't think i t obaoleteef?) the will. 
18 Mr lolley; wall, will Donald tell me before 
Id the hearing? 
20 Mr. Brintont That l a ay undexetending o f i t 
22 your honor 
22 The c o u r t : Donald T o l l e y l a your unc le? 
2 1 Hr. T o l l e y : He l a the on* who's i n charge 
24 Of. 
25 the Court: You'll all be given an 
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1 f<r. Brinton: Have nine 
3 The Courtt turves? 
I Mr. Tolley: yup. 
4 The Court: Ok, well, the worse part ia over, 
5 I uh, didn't nean to be unkind to anyone, 1 hope 2 
6 haven't been, I've just been a little frustrated in 
? trying to figure out myaelt what I'm doing with the 
8 different oxdeca and trying to explain end then a 
9 lltuation where no one haa behaved with ill will in my 
10 opinion, but we've got money floating in a lot of 
11 different places end it need* to be held until e 
12 determination haa been nade. so if you'll hang on 
13 folk*, we will «ak* 3, better make it 4 coplee of that. 
14 And then we'll *end then out to the reat of the 
15 parties. If there are other will*, do everything you 
IS can to locate then and certainly Mri Brinton will calk 
1? to you. And, when you remember the lawyer'a name, the 
1ft first and best thing you can Oo ia to call Mr. Brinton 
19 to they ean atart talking about lt» 
20 M*. Jack*: Ye*, because he told n* the will 
21 wa» obsolete Mhen aha put it into my account. It isn't 
22 under any legal obligation to give it to anybody other 
23 than ny grandmother' * obligation which 1* a little 
24 higher than legal1* 1 would give everybody whet my 
25 grandma ha* asked *e to. 
1 opportunity to appear, you'll have an opportunity to 
2 pcot'est his serving a* executor is that hie poaition ox 
3 personal repreaentative? 
4 Mr Brinton: Personal represent* tive. 
5 The Court: nnd that really the only one at 
6 this point who has the right to object ere heirs to the 
7 vill, and the other parson who's designated, well, 
8 there were two people hut one was, another who died. 
9 Mr. Tolley: Right, and then sneryl was out 
10 aunt. 
11 The Couit: D O you want the original council 
12 in to give ma a copy? 
13 Mr. Brinton: z have not yet filed these 
14 paper* with the court. 
15 The court: They're filed, should be stamp it 
1$ Michelle, let's stamp it, w«'li keep the copy, you teke 
2? the original and the copy in case you have problem* 
2« when you g«t back. 
19 Mr. Brinton: Do you have copies? 
20 The court: Me've got the original* 
21 Ms. Jacks: I thought (inaudible*. 
22 The court.» so tn*t it can be strvvd on a 
23 (inaudible!. 
2* Ms. Jet**: Wa'il g«t this back from the 
25 attorney. 
Page 3fl 
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1 The Court: And then we get this bee* after 
it's been served on (inaudible). 
3 Hr Tolley: so do *e not know if Don Tolley 
4 is coming tip to salt lake tor any o* this 7 
$ The court; He vill be getting * notice and, 
4 council* r assume your client is intending to come i* 
7 that correct* 
8 Mr. nrinton: Correct, ( inaudible) 
• The court: On whatever date v* arrive a t , 
0 reneober the data i s no t l i k e l y to be Daeenber 3rd, 
1 unless you can work something out v i t h council and 
2 tha t ' s always a p o s s i b i l i t y . But i t yon want a 
3 d i f f erent date , give us a c a l l . 
4 Mr. Tolley; My only concern 1« the l a s t t l » e 
3 be came co town, he frequently allowed himself over t o 
€ my house saying I t v** h i s evothar*1 beuse ana T den' t 
7 vent any I s sues with bin. teying to do that . 
9 The Court: Ho, I c a n ' t do anything about 
9 that, but 1 can ask Mr. Brinten to speak to h i s c l i e n t , 
0 t e l l your c l i e n t chat no good i s ?oing t o come from 
:3 in teract ing at th i s po int in a h o s t i l e manner, uh, v i t h 
3 (Inaudible) . Are you w i l l i n g t o do that? 
:3 Mr. brlnton: Yes your honor, that was before 
:4 be retained u s . 
;5 Tbe Court: That's what 1 f igured, one* you 
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ADDENDUM 4 
(Memorandum Decision) 
FIUD DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 6 2006 
1
 Deputy Cfc 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THB MATTER OF THB ESTATE OF: : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NINA B. TOLLEY, $ CASE NO* 033901655 
Deceased. t 
DONALD RAY TOLLEY, z 
Petitioner, : 
vs* t 
MICHAEL TOLLEY and MARIE JESS, : 
Defendants* : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on February 2, 2006, 
in connection with respondent Michael Tolley's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and respondent Marie Jess's Motion for Summary Judgment, The 
Court also heard argument on the petitioner's Motion to Extend Discovery. 
The Court granted the petitioner's Motion re; discovery and extended 
discovery for a period of 30 days so that the depositions of Carl Timothy 
Claridge, formerly of First Utah Bank, and Shelly Christopher, formerly 
of Bank One, could be taken. These depositions occurred on February 28, 
2006. 
At the conclusion of the February 2, 2006, hearing, the Court then 
took the matter -under advisement. On March 16, 2006, the petitioner 
filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent Marie Jess' 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, On March 23, 2006, respondent Marie Jess 
filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Respondent Marie Jess then filed a Supplemental Request to 
Submit for Decision. 
After the Court took the matter under advisement, it took the 
opportunity to carefully review the entire record in this case, 
consisting of 5 volumes of pleadings and documents. As counsel 
suggested, the Court has examined each of the numerous Affidavits and 
transcripts of various depositions which accompanied the pending Motions 
and the supplemental Memoranda- The Court has also reviewed the 
relevant legal authority, much of which counsel graciously provided to 
the Court. Finally, the Court has viewed a videotape of the February 
2, 2006, hearing. Now being fully informed, the Court rules as stated 
herein* 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
There are a number of issues presented by the respondents' 
respective Motions for Summary Judgment. However, in deciding whether 
the respondents' Motions are meritorious, the Court has particularly 
focused on the issues of whether the respondents had a legally-defined 
confidential relationship with the decedent and whether there is any 
evidence that they substituted their will for hers in her decisions 
regarding paying certain bills, making a down payment on a home purchased 
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by respondent Michael Tolley and creating three joint bank accounts with 
respondent Marie Jess. 
During oral argument, the Court inquired of the petitioner's counsel 
what specific evidence he had that the decedent was unduly influenced* 
Although counsel's argument was not entirely clear, it appears that the 
petitioner's primary evidence is the decedent's spending habits shortly 
before her death, as compared to her frugality throughout her life. 
According to counsel, the differential in the decedent's spending habits 
creates an inference that the respondents must have unduly influenced the 
decedent in her decisions to make gifts to them or to pay certain of 
respondent Michael Tolley's expenses. 
At the outset, the Court notes that it has reviewed numerous cases 
discussing the indicia of a legally-defined confidential relationship. 
In those cases where a confidential relationship was found, the key 
factors included not only confidence and trust, but also a relationship 
of inequality and dominion, including the ability to influence to such 
a degree that the person's will is overcome or overpowered. See In Re 
Estate of Karney, 658 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. 2003). 
In this case, there is a tremendous amount of evidence concerning 
the decedent's state of mind at the time that she made the gifts/payments 
in question. While the parties' interpretations of this evidence differs 
and they reach different inferences/ there is one core fact which is not 
in dispute. Paragraph 3 of Michael Tolley's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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which the petitioner did not dispute/ specifically states: "Nina Tolley 
was always very firm minded. Even up until the end of her life, she was 
mentally sharp, decisive, strong willed and knew exactly what she wanted 
and what she did not want* Nina Tolley made up her mind, and you could 
not change it for her." Not only is this fact undisputed, but it is 
supported by numerous Affidavits and deposition testimony. These 
Affidavits and deposition testimony provide uncontroverted evidence that 
while the decedent's physical strength may have deteriorated in the 
months leading up to her death, her mental acuity, her strong will and 
her ability to make up her own mind did not diminish. 
The evidence indicates that the decedent remained in contact with 
her confidant, Mr. Dolecheck, as well as various medical caretakers and 
could have, at any time, voiced her concerns that the respondents were 
manipulating her or trying to take advantage of her. The decedent made 
no such statements to any of the people with whom she had contact. 
Notably, the petitioner attempts to skew Mr. Dolecheck's testimony to 
suggest that the decedent regretted her move to Utah. This is not an 
accurate interpretation of Mr. Dolecheck's testimony. To the contrary, 
Mr. Dolecheck's testimony confirms that he stayed in contact with the 
decedent throughout her time in Utah and that she remained an individual 
who was in control of her faculties. 
In addition, the decedent had access to banking personnel with whom 
she consulted and who advised her prior to her establishment of the three 
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joint bank accounts with Ms* Jess* The decedent's access to these 
various individuals further indicates that she was not prone to undue 
influence with respect to the creation of these joint accounts. The 
deposition testimony of Ms. Christopher and Mr. Claridge, who consulted 
with the decedent regarding her banking and the creation of the joint 
bank accounts with respondent Marie Jess, is particularly edifying on the 
decedent's state of mind and the issue of undue influence. Both Ms. 
Christopher and Mr. Claridge confirm that the decedent was very 
particular in communicating her intentions and that she did not make any 
statements or gestures which would indicate that she was being coerced, 
manipulated or otherwise directed in her actions* 
It should be emphasized that the petitioner has not provided one 
shred of evidence which would counter the overwhelming amount of 
Affidavit and deposition testimony, including from independent third-
parties, indicating that the decedent remained mentally capable, strong 
willed and not susceptible to undue influence up until the time of her 
death. Instead, the petitioner relies on inferences which cannot be 
reasonably made and incorrect interpretations of the evidence in the 
record. 
Given the complete absence of evidence to indicate that the 
respondents controlled the decedent's decision-making or that they 
overcame her will, the Court determines that, as a matter of law, the 
petitioner has failed to establish a confidential relationship between 
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the decedent and the respondents or that the respondents unduly 
influenced the decedent. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein and 
on the more detailed grounds provided in the respondents' moving papers, 
the Court grants the respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment on the 
claims relating to a confidential relationship, undue influence and 
violation of the decedents' intentions and free will. As a corollary, 
the Court grants their Motions for Summary Judgment on the fraud, 
conversion and constructive trust claims. The Court determines that the 
petitioner's claim was not brought in bad faith and therefore declines 
to award attorney's fees to the respondents. 
The Court directs counsel for each of the respondents to prepare 
Orders which are consistent with, but not limited to, this Memorandum 
Decision, indicating that with the exception of their request for 
attorney's fees, the respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment are 
granted in the entirety. The Court has entered the petitioner's and 
respondent Marie Jess' Orders Granting their Ex Parte Applications for 
Leave to Pile a Supplemental Memoranda. 
Dated this /^V?-^dav of May, 2006. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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